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Duty of Care and
Slippery Floors
In a previous issue of this journal (August
2007, pp. 26-28), the writer examined recent
case law on the distinction between
“activity” dangers and “premises” dangers
under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957. In
this article, he considers the duty of care
owed by a shop owner under the Act to
keep floors clean and clear of spillages. 
It is well established that an occupier owes a
common law duty to take reasonable care to
see that the floors in his premises are kept
clean and free from spillages so that
customers are reasonably safe. He does not,
of course, have to guarantee their safety –
the obligation is to take “reasonable care” 
in all the circumstances of the particular case:
see, s.2(2) of the Occupier’s Liability Act
1957. In Turner v. Arding & Hobbs Ltd [1949]
2 All E.R. 911, at 912, Lord Goddard C.J
stated the common law principle as follows:
“The duty of a shopkeeper in this class of
case . . . [is] to use reasonable care to see
that the shop floor, on which people are
invited, is kept reasonably safe, and if an
unusual danger is present of which the
injured person is unaware, and the danger
is one which would not be expected and
ought not to be present . . . there is a
burden thrown on the defendants either
of explaining how this thing got on the
floor or giving me far more evidence than
they have as to the state of the floor and
the watch that was kept on it immediately
before the accident.”
This approach was fully endorsed by the
majority of the Court of Appeal in the well-
known case of Ward v. Tesco Stores Ltd
[1976] 1 All E.R. 219 and now, more 
recently, in the High Court ruling in Piccolo v.
Larkstock Ltd (Trading as Chiltern Flowers) and
Others, 17 July 2007, (available on Lawtel).
Ward v. Tesco Stores
In Ward, the defendants owned and managed
a supermarket store. While shopping, the
claimant slipped on some yoghurt which had
been spilt on the floor and was injured. Her
claim for negligence against the store
succeeded on the basis that the onus was on
the defendants to give some explanation to
show that the accident had not arisen from
any want of care on their part. In this
connection, the probabilities were that, by
the time of the accident, the spillage had
been on the floor long enough for it to have
been cleared up by the defendant’s staff – in
the absence, therefore, of any explanation by
the defendants, the court was entitled to
conclude that the accident had occurred
because the defendants had failed to take
reasonable care. Significantly, the defendants
did not adduce any evidence as to when the
floor had last been cleaned before the
claimant’s accident. In the course of his
judgment, Lawton L.J. set out the basic duty
of care in the following terms (at 221):
“ . . . those in charge of the store knew
that during the course of a working day
there was a likelihood of spillages
occurring from time to time . . . The
management should have appreciated
that if there are patches of slippery
substances on the floor people are liable
to step into them and that, if they do, they
may slip. It follows that if those are the
conditions to be expected in the store
there must be some reasonably effective
system for getting rid of the dangers which
may from time to time exist.”
His Lordship then considered the evidential
burden to establish the discharge of the duty
(at 222) in this way:
“The accident was such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if floors
are kept clean and spillages are dealt with
as soon as they occur. If an accident does
happen because the floor are covered
with spillage, then in my judgment some
explanation should be forthcoming from
the defendants to show that the accident
did not arise from any want of care on
their part; and in the absence of any
explanation the judge may give judgment
for the [claimant].”
Professor Mark Pawlowski considers a
recent High Court decision on an occupier’s
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A similar approach was adopted by Megaw
L.J who put the matter in this way (at 224):
“It is for the [claimant] to show that there
has occurred an event which is unusual
and which, in the absence of explanation,
is more consistent with fault on the part of
the defendants than the absence of fault 
. . . When the [claimant] has established
that, the defendants can still escape from
liability . . . if they could show that the
accident must have happened, or even on
balance of probability would have been
likely to have happened, irrespective of
the existence of a proper and adequate
system, in relation to the circumstances, to
provide for the safety of customers.”
It is apparent from the foregoing that, once
the likelihood of a spillage is known to the
defendant, the onus is on him to show that
the accident would have occurred
notwithstanding a reasonably effective system
for avoiding the dangers. This, as we shall see,
is the approach taken by the court in Piccolo
involving a florist’s duty to protect pedestrians
from the risk of slipping on fallen petals by
providing a reasonable and effective system
for dealing with the danger of spillage on
floors. Before turning to this case, however, it
is instructive to consider some of the earlier
case law. 
Other Cases
In Dobson v. Asda Stores Ltd, unreported,
March 19, 2002, Middlesborough County
Court, [2002] CLY 358, the claimant slipped
on a cherry in Asda’s produce department.
He argued that the store had been negligent
in failing to place slip mats in the produce
section and, more generally, in failing to have
an adequate system for maintaining a safe
floor in that department. In response, the
defendant contended that the cherry had
been dropped by a customer and that
cleaning had taken place every half hour by
employees trained to deal with spillages on
the floor. The court held that that the
defendants were not liable. Although there
was clearly a risk that cherries might fall to
the floor, it was not necessary to place slip
mats in areas any further than the relevant
display. Moreover, the defendant’s cleaning
system was excellent and there had been
only four accidents recorded that year
despite the 1.3 million customers that had
used the store. Crucially, the cherry had been
on the floor for only a short time – the
accident having occurred only 10 minutes
after the last clean in the department.
Similarly, in Laverton v. Kiapasha (Trading as
Takeaway Supreme) [2002] EWCA Civ 1656,
the floor of a takeaway shop was wet from
rain that had been walked into the premises
by various customers. The claimant had gone
into the shop wearing cowboy-style boots
after consuming a considerable amount of
alcohol. As she walked in, she slipped and
fractured her ankle. The floor was laid with
slip-resistant tiles, but the unfixed doormat
had become displaced at the time of the
accident. The owner had a system for
mopping up the floor but this could not be
done when (as at the time of the accident)
the shop was full. In holding that the owner
had not breached his duty of care under
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s.2(2) of the 1957 Act, the Court of Appeal
distinguished the Ward case on the ground
that it was not reasonable to expect a shop
owner to deal straightaway with the “naturally
occurring phenomenon of walked-in water”
which applied to all premises everywhere.
Unlike a particular hazard such as a greasy
spillage, this was not an unusual or concealed
danger which could be completely avoided.
In the words of Hale J (at para. 17):
“Everyone coming in from the wet outside to
the drier inside brings water with them on
their feet.” At busy times, therefore, it was
simply not practicable for a small shopkeeper
to mop up rainwater as it arrived. At such
times, customers could be expected to take
reasonable care for their own safety,
particularly as this was something obvious of
which they ought to be aware.
By contrast, in Bell v. Department of Health
and Social Security, unreported, 12 June
1989, (available on Lawtel), the claimant
sought damages for personal in injury
occasioned by a fall on a marble passage
floor in an office block which had been made
slippery from constant spillages of tea and
other beverages. Drake J. had no difficulty in
holding that the defendants were in breach of
their statutory duty under s.2 of the
Occupier’s Liability Act 1957 and s.16 of the
Office Shops and Railway Premises Act 1963.
Different considerations will also apply if the
injury is sustained on domestic premises. In
Fryer v. Pearson, unreported, 15 March 2000,
(available on Lawtel), the Court of Appeal
held that the position of a householder was
not the same as the case where a customer
slips on the floor of a shop. In the domestic
context, each case depended on its own
circumstances. In Fryer, the claimant was a
gas fitter who had knelt on a needle when he
called at the defendants’ home to fit a new
gas fire. He claimed damages for personal
injury alleging a breach of the duty of care
under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957. His
claimed failed as negligence could only be
established if the defendants knew that the
needle was in the carpet and had permitted it
to remain there. The mere presence of the
needle could not give rise to a breach of duty
of care under s.2(2) of the Act – there was
no foreseeable risk of injury to an adult visitor
other than a pin prick.
Decision in Piccolo
The first defendant was the owner of a flower
shop on a station concourse at Marylebone
Station owned and operated by the second
defendant railway company. The claimant
had slipped on a petal and some water
outside the flower shop and sustained
personal injuries. He claimed damages for
negligence under the 1957 Act alleging that
the shop owner had failed to operate a safe
cleaning system and that the railway
company ought to have taken steps as were
necessary to ensure that the former kept the
shop and concourse in a clean and safe
manner. By way of defence, the shop owner
argued that it had operated a reasonable
system of “clean as you go” and that, as a
small florist, it was not possible (or
reasonable) for it to have kept the floor dry
and petal-free at all times.
This argument, however, was emphatically
rejected by the court. According to His
Honour Judge J. Altman (sitting as a Judge of
the High Court), the presence of the petals
on the station concourse in the area in front
of the shop had created a foreseeable hazard
of slipping for pedestrians. Indeed, members
of the railway company’s staff had highlighted
to the shop owner on several occasions
before the accident concerns about safety
risks posed by fallen petals from flower
displays and water spillages. Moreover, unlike
any other florist’s shop, the shop owner’s
duty of care had to be measured in the
context of the large number of people
passing all day across the front of the shop
along a busy station concourse. In this
context, therefore, a purely reactive system in
which steps were taken only when something
was brought to the shop owner’s notice was
not enough to guard against the risk of falling
on a slippery floor. A pro-active system was
necessary for getting rid of the dangers that
might arise from time to time. Accordingly, in
the absence of a proper and safe system for
dealing with the dangers, the shop owner
was clearly in breach of its duty of care. 
In reaching this conclusion, the learned judge
was mindful to follow the approach taken in
Ward in identifying the requisite duty of care
and establishing the constituent evidential
elements of a breach. On this point, he
concluded (at para. 47):
“I find the type of accident that was
sustained by the claimant is not one that
in the ordinary course of events does
occur and that the first defendant has
failed to establish that they had in place
and effective and reasonable system for
dealing with spillages.”
Moreover, unlike the facts in Laverton, above,
the danger here could not be characterised
as necessarily obvious to passers-by engaged
in their own pre-occupations. As mentioned
earlier, a “spillage” case falls to be
distinguished from a situation where the
wetness is general because of rain brought in
by the feet of customers. In the former case,
it is incumbent on the shopkeeper to deal
with the problem in a pro-active way rather
than simply deal with the problem as and
when it arises.
The railway company, on the other hand, was
held not to be at fault as it had discharged its
common duty of care as an occupier of the
concourse by the imposition of contractual
obligations upon the shop owner and the
extent of supervision that it had exercised
through appropriate warnings. In this
connection, the shop owner’s lease provided
that it should keep the premises in a “clean and
tidy condition and employ only competent
and respectable persons as cleaners”. 
Contributory
Negligence
In both the Ward and Piccolo cases, the
claimant was held not to be contributory
negligent in slipping on the floor. In the
former case, Lawton L.J. accepted that
“shoppers, intent on looking to see what is on
offer, cannot be expected to look where they
are putting their feet”: ibid, at 221. Similarly,
in Piccolo, the learned judge concluded that
the claimant had not been walking other than
with reasonable care at the time of the
accident and had not been careless in failing
to notice the petal. Adopting the language of
Lawton L.J. in Ward, he felt that the same
applied “to a pedestrian walking, with many
others, across the busy concourse of a
railway station, looking ahead to see where
he or she is going”: ibid, at para. 64.
By contrast, in Laverton, the Court of Appeal
indicated that, had the shop owner been
liable, liability would have been apportioned
at 50 per cent between the parties so as to
reflect the claimant’s contributory negligence
in failing to take care when stepping on the
wet tiled floor.
Conclusion
The decision in Piccolo confirms that, once
the claimant is able to point to an accident
which is unusual and which, in the absence
of explanation, is more consistent with fault
on the part of the shop owner, the burden
shifts to the owner to show that the accident
happened notwithstanding the existence of a
proper and adequate system to safeguard
customers from injury.
It is apparent also that the shop owner’s duty
of care will be assessed by reference to the
particular shop in question. Thus, where there
is a foreseeable risk of falling debris that may
cause injury if walked on by a potentially
large number of customers, a pro-active
system of safeguards may be called for to
discharge the owner’s duty of care. As
indicated by the learned judge, this would
necessarily involve a sufficient presence of
staff with “on-going responsibility . . . to
ensure the finding and removal of spillage
very soon after it had fallen”: ibid, at para. 40.
Interestingly, the precautions which were
taken by the supermarket in Ward were 
(1) the system of having the floor brushed
five or six times during the working day and
(2) giving instructions to staff that, if they saw
any spillage on the floor, they were to stay
where the spill had taken place and call
somebody to clean it up. On the facts,
however, these were held to be deficient
since the probabilities were that the relevant
spillage had been on the floor long enough
for it to have been cleaned up by a member
of staff.  
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